The discussion focuses on how populism as a political phenomenon can be rooted in relevant individual differences in the psychological features of voters. Furthermore we found that voters with strong populist attitudes had a tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in the form of the biased evaluation of the foreseeability of the referendum results, making simplified and self-reassuring evaluations aligned with their vote choice. Populist attitudes in turn explained part of the variance in vote choice at both referenda, after controlling for reform evaluation and political orientation. Findings indicate that populist attitudes were associated with relevant psychosocial factors, such as nationalism, political efficacy, and conspiracist beliefs. In this study, we analysed data from the 20 ITANES panel surveys, where populist attitudes were measured by a 6-item scale. Less research has been devoted to the individual psychological factors associated with populist attitudes, and to how those can influence political decisions, such as vote choice in an election or referendum. Our results help explain why narcissists may fail to learn from their experiences.įollowing the rise of populist parties and leaders in the last decade, research has extensively investigated the political and economic factors that have driven some voters towards populism. We also discuss implications for eliciting should counterfactual thinking.
We discuss why exhibiting some hindsight bias can be positive after failure. Finally, by manipulating should counterfactual thinking in Study 4, our findings suggest that this type of thinking has a causal effect on hindsight bias. In Study 3 we ruled out could counterfactual thinking as an alternative explanation for the relationship between narcissism and hindsight bias.
Second, in Study 2 we examined a moderated sequential mediation model, in which the relation between narcissism and perceived learning is sequentially mediated through should counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias, and importantly, this sequential mediation is moderated by prediction accuracy. First, in Study 1 we examined a moderated mediation model, in which should counterfactual thinking mediates the relation between narcissism and hindsight bias, and this mediation is moderated by prediction accuracy such that the relationship is negative when predictions are accurate and positive when predictions are inaccurate after accurate predictions. To test these effects, we conducted four studies (total n = 727). The present research sought to examine the impact of narcissism, prediction accuracy, and should counterfactual thinking-which includes thoughts such as “I should have done something different”-on hindsight bias (the tendency to exaggerate in hindsight what one knew in foresight) and perceived learning. In this article, I introduce the reader to the basic designs used to study the bias, key cognitive and motivational mechanisms, the major controversies, and some unstudied questions that I hope will guide future research. But just how bad is it? Although guided by a cold cognitive mechanism that ‘creeps up’ on us, hindsight bias is complex, seemingly strengthened, and yet also reduced by self-serving motives. This interest stems from the belief that failure to be surprised by an event prevents us from learning from it, and will likely cause us to judge others unfairly for not having been able to foresee it. It is robust, often difficult to reduce, and appeals to researchers with a wide range of interests including history, business, law, medicine, and of course, psychology. Its basic tenet – that things seem less surprising in hindsight than they should – is instantly recognizable as a common human flaw. Like a well-developed character in a novel, the bias has something for everyone. Thirty-five years since the publication of Fischhoff’s (1975) seminal article, we continue to be fascinated by the hindsight bias.
0 kommentar(er)
